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INTRODUCTION 
 
On the thirtieth anniversary of the release of Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove 
or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964), journalist Eric 
Lefcowitz proposed that the film had a great impact on American culture. Lefcowitz 
declared, “Three decades after the film debuted, Dr. Strangelove has entered the pop 
vernacular, a metaphor for the deadly consequences of science—and government—gone 
awry.”1 Indeed, Dr. Strangelove made its mark upon popular culture, yet this statement 
does not explain the effects felt throughout American society after the motion picture’s 
release. Kubrick’s film prompted a debate over cold war policies that had positioned the 
world on the edge of destruction. When President Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush 
reinvigorated US nuclear research and development, critics invoked the film to warn the 
public about the dangers of US nuclear policies. As war with Iraq became imminent, 
critics of George W. Bush referenced the film when discussing the president, suggesting 
the film’s meaning had expanded to include the desire to wage a conventional war.  
 In his foreword to American History/American Film: Interpreting the Hollywood 
Image (1979), Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. recognized the relationship between films and 
their audiences. He noted that an audience was an “active collaborator” with the 
filmmaker, “seizing from the film what it needs for its own purposes of tutelage and 
fantasy.” This collaboration occurs when the audience recognizes similarities between its 
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world and the filmmaker’s celluloid world.2 Kubrick’s audience entered the theaters 
shaped by contemporary events such as the arms race, the Cuban missile crisis, and the 
assassination of President Kennedy.  
In the decade prior to the film’s release, the Soviet Union and the United States 
operated on the assumption that the only way to deter a nuclear attack was to accumulate 
a massive arsenal that guaranteed the mutual destruction of the aggressor.3 The conflict 
between the two superpowers placed these nations at odds and the rest of the world in 
jeopardy. On 22 October 1962, President Kennedy announced that the Soviets had 
constructed missile silos and delivered nuclear weapons to Cuba. At that moment, 
Americans realized that their determination to dominate the nuclear arms race and halt 
the spread of communism had influenced Khrushchev to position nuclear weapons ninety 
miles off the coast of Florida and created a crisis that could result in nuclear war. 
Khrushchev had to appear willing to support “wars of liberation” in order to maintain his 
precarious friendship with the Chinese and Cuban dictator Fidel Castro.4 The tense 
standoff convinced many Americans, including President Kennedy, that changes in 
policy and diplomacy were necessary to avoid future clashes between the two nations. 
The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 appeared to signal the beginning of a new era in 
atomic and foreign diplomacy, but the Soviet Union and the United States continued to 
develop and stockpile nuclear weapons. The November 1963 assassination of President 
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Kennedy left many Americans feeling as though the chance for peace died with him. The 
arms race and the Cuban missile crisis had led to calls for changes in U.S. policies, but 
few were witnessed. In January 1964, Dr. Strangelove premiered to an audience prepared 
to laugh after years of crises and the death of the president, but also to abandon its faith in 
the bomb and question the total war on communism that had been born in the closing 
months of World War II.   
By the late 1950s, director Stanley Kubrick had begun to research the topic of 
nuclear warfare with the hope of making a film about a “nuclear nightmare.” He 
accumulated a library of about seventy books on the subject and subscribed to a variety 
of military magazines to better understand nuclear strategies and technology. In the 
course of his research, he met Alastair Buchan of the Institute of Strategic Studies in 
England. Buchan recommended that Kubrick read former Royal Air Force (RAF) officer 
Peter George’s nuclear suspense drama Red Alert (1958). Kubrick took Buchan’s advice 
and decided to use the text as the source for a film on the possibility of an accidental 
nuclear war. Although Kubrick decided to adapt Red Alert for the screen, he wrestled 
with George’s treatment of the possibility of nuclear war and the fitting genre for that 
story. 5 
When Kubrick began the screenplay, he intended to write and direct a dramatic 
feature similar to Red Alert. Peter George had criticized the military’s instinct to wage 
war, which he believed could lead to an unauthorized preemptive strike against the Soviet 
Union. In Red Alert, George suggested that politicians’ management of the nuclear 
arsenal might better ensure peace. George utilized the suspense drama genre to convey 
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this criticism, but Kubrick altered the message that George offered readers in Red Alert. 
As a result, he was forced to alter the genre to effectively convey his concerns. Kubrick 
was struck by the many paradoxes of US nuclear policies and strategies—“from the 
paradoxes of unilateral disarmament to the first strike.”6 He intended to expose these 
paradoxes in Dr. Strangelove. Initially, he discarded scenes that depicted humorous or 
absurd expressions of these paradoxes. He believed that comedic exchanges between 
characters were inappropriate for a film about the end of the world. Eventually, he 
decided that the best treatment of the subject would be as a satire, or “nightmare 
comedy.” These absurd scenes expressed Kubrick’s concerns.7  
 Dr. Strangelove offered no characters worthy of the audience’s trust. The writing 
team altered and consolidated characters in George’s novel to suggest that military, 
political, and scientific officials could not prevent a nuclear apocalypse. Audiences were 
expected to draw comparisons between these characters and contemporary figures and 
sentiments. The deranged General Ripper (Sterling Hayden), who ordered the 843rd 
Bomb Wing to attack the Soviet Union, represented conservative factions of the 1950s 
and early 1960s that believed that an international communist conspiracy had infiltrated 
American society. General “Buck” Turgidson (George C. Scott) represented military 
commanders such as General Curtis LeMay, commander of the Strategic Air Command 
and an advocate of the utilization of nuclear weapons, to halt the spread of communism. 
President Merkin Muffley (Peter Sellers), the liberal diplomat loosely based upon Adlai 
Stevenson’s appearance and persona, failed to avert Ripper’s apocalypse, suggesting that 
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US nuclear policies provided no other alternative than war. Kubrick constructed Dr. 
Strangelove (also Sellers) to criticize certain members of the scientific community and 
man’s inability to control the technological progress he insatiably pursued. 
Audiences’ and critics’ responses were mixed. While some audiences 
simultaneously laughed and worried about the threat of nuclear Armageddon, others 
scoffed at what they considered anti-American propaganda. Newspapers such as the New 
York Times and magazines such as Commentary provided forums for the opinions of 
critics, intellectuals, and the public. Letters were printed that praised and criticized 
Kubrick’s film. In a letter to the Times, Lewis Mumford pointed out Kubrick’s criticism 
of the public’s “cold war trance.”8 Film critics debated the worth of the film, although 
this debate often centered on Kubrick’s political message rather than the motion picture’s 
artistic qualities. Amid this heated discourse, some Americans accepted Kubrick’s 
warning. Initially, the film became a reference to 1964 Republican presidential nominee 
Barry Goldwater, who appeared willing to wage nuclear war to halt the spread of 
communism. Dr. Strangelove became an icon for those who questioned the nation’s cold 
war policies. By the early 1980s, Dr. Strangelove had become a point of reference for 
historians, journalists, and politicians. 
A few scholarly works have examined the messages embedded in Dr. 
Strangelove. These works have been small essays and articles that only offer brief studies 
of the film. In 1978, Lawrence Suid argued that Kubrick made the film “to warn the 
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nation about the possible dangers of the safeguard system.”9 Suid is correct that Kubrick 
criticized the military’s cold war policies, but his narrow focus of the film neglected 
Kubrick’s criticism of politicians and scientists. Kubrick’s comments about the film also 
reveal his broader criticism of military, political, and scientific communities. Suid also 
argued that Kubrick’s message was lost in the audience’s laughter, yet letters and reviews 
indicate that some audience members recognized the realism of the film.10 Furthermore, 
this reaction suggests that audiences understood Kubrick’s message.  
The following year, Charles Maland argued that Dr. Strangelove challenged what 
Geoffrey Hodgson called the Ideology of Liberal Consensus, the dominant cultural 
paradigm in America at the time of the film’s release.11 Hodgson suggested that this 
ideology contained two basic assumptions: first, that the structure of American society 
was sound; and second, that communism posed a threat to the survival of the United 
States. Maland argued that Kubrick satirized the cold war consensus in four ways: “anti-
Communist paranoia; the culture’s inability to realize the enormity of nuclear war; 
various nuclear strategies; and the blind faith modern man places in technological 
progress.”12 However, Maland did not examine the subjects of Kubrick’s satire in great 
detail. Another shortcoming of Maland’s research was his failure to uncover the heated 
debate over the film expressed in reviews and editorials. Maland incorrectly suggested 
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that audiences were not “swept away by the film.” The debate that followed the film’s 
release suggests that audiences were affected by the film.13  
Most recently, Margot Henriksen wrote Dr. Strangelove’s America: Society and 
Culture in the Atomic Age (1997). Henriksen’s title is misleading, in that only a small 
portion of the book actually addresses Kubrick’s film. Henriksen devoted the majority of 
her text to the study of less obvious criticisms of the bomb. She characterized Dr. 
Strangelove as the culmination of dissent in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Henriksen 
argued that Kubrick warned audiences that, if they failed to challenge the cold war 
consensus, their fate would be the same as President Merkin Muffley’s America. 
However, she failed to examine specific aspects of the cold war that the film satirized and 
Kubrick’s comments and essays about the film that explain the filmmaker’s intent.14  
John E. O’Connor contributed an essay to the December 1988 forum on film and 
history in the American Historical Review that provided the methodology for this study. 
O’Connor examined the use of films as historical “artifacts” or documents. Although 
much of O’Connor’s essay proposed a methodology for the study of historical films, his 
ideas can be applied to this project. He proposed that the historian should attempt to 
“understand how a film represents or interprets history,” to confirm theories about “then-
current social and cultural values,” to uncover “factual data not otherwise available,” and 
to trace the history of film and television. 15 O’Connor suggested that in order to 
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understand a film’s contemporary relevance or impact, a historian must understand the 
audience’s experience. This experience can be understood through the study of “other 
films current at the time, the novels, the news and magazine stories, and other social or 
cultural influences that may have oriented the viewer at some specific place and time in 
the past to respond to the film in one way or another.”16 This project will examine how 
Dr. Strangelove represented and interpreted contemporary events and the ways in which 
Kubrick reflected and challenged contemporary values and beliefs. 
This thesis contributes to the literature on Dr. Strangelove by arguing that the film 
impacted the public discourse on the cold war and American culture. This project will 
argue that audiences understood Kubrick’s message, although they reacted to it different 
ways. Critics and audiences debated the film’s treatment of nuclear weapons. More 
importantly, Dr. Strangelove encouraged greater discussion of the soundness of current 
cold war policies. This thesis will also analyze Kubrick’s adaptation of Red Alert to 
understand how and why the genre and criticism changed. Finally, this project will 
examine the ways in which journalists and historians began to incorporate the film into 
their studies of the cold war and analyses of contemporary events, borrowing scenes, 
dialogue, and metaphors in order to draw parallels to the seemingly absurd and often 
dangerous events of the cold war. This thesis will also analyze how the film has been 
invoked in the discussion of post-cold war military and nuclear policies.  
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